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New light on an old question
Following President Trump’s appointment of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh the
question has arisen as to whether, in the coming years, the U.S. Supreme Court will
overrule its seminal judgment in Roe v. Wade (1973). Roe established a woman’s
fundamental right to choose to have an abortion before the viability of the fetus.
The idea that a conservative majority in the Supreme Court might reverse Roe is
hardly new. In his concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), for example,
Justice Blackmun – the Justice who wrote Roe – worried about the possibility and
warned against it: “I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single
vote necessary to extinguish the light.” The question of Roe’s destiny appears
more pressing today than ever before because reversing the case has formed part
of President Trump’s successful political platform. In October, 2016, when asked
whether he wanted the Supreme Court to overturn Roe, soon-to-be President Trump
answered: “If we put another two or perhaps three justices on, that is really what will
happen. That will happen automatically in my opinion. Because I am putting pro-life
justices on the court.” Has the President kept his promise?
In 1973, Roe stated the principle that the right to privacy “is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Yet this
right “is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation.” In particular, a state may assert an interest in protecting potential life,
but only at a certain point during pregnancy does this interest become “compelling”,
thereby allowing a state to proscribe abortion. This point coincides with the viability
of the fetus, i.e. the ability of the fetus to survive outside the mother’s womb, which,
at the time Roe was decided, was generally considered to occur at 28 weeks
of pregnancy but is now placed approximately at 24 weeks. To sum it up, Roe
recognized “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and
to obtain it without undue interference from the State”.
Subsequent judgments redefined the criteria to assess the constitutionality of the
state’s intervention without questioning Roe’s core holding: the fundamental right
to have a pre-viability abortion. In particular, in Casey (1992), a plurality opinion
developed the “undue burden” test, ruling that a state regulation is unconstitutional
when it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus”. The “undue burden” test
still governs the review of abortion laws, although in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt (2016), the Court refined it toward a proper balancing test, requiring
courts to “consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer”.
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In contrast to the law in question in Casey and in Whole Woman’s Health, recent
abortion laws directly challenge Roe’s essential holding and will therefore offer
the Supreme Court the opportunity to review – and potentially overrule – the
fundamental right to have a pre-viability abortion.
State-driven strategic litigation
In early 2019, emboldened by Trump’s victory and by the new appointments to the
Supreme Court, several states have passed restrictive laws which forbid abortion
well before viability. For example, Utah and Arkansas passed laws prohibiting
abortion after 18 weeks of pregnancy, while a group of other states, including
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio, passed so-called
“heartbeat-laws” prohibiting abortion as soon as the heartbeat of the fetus can be
detected, i.e. approximately from the 6th week of pregnancy. Alabama passed the
most restrictive abortion law, punishing doctors who perform abortion without even
providing for exceptions in case of rape or incest.
All of these laws, none of which has been enforced, share the same goal. As Eric
Johnston – a pro-life attorney who drafted the Alabama bill – explained, they are
meant to be a “vehicle” to get the Supreme Court to revisit Roe. In an interview
with NPR on Alabama’s effective ban on abortion, he made it clear that he expects
“it to be holdings of unconstitutionality in the trial court and in the appellate court”
and is hopeful that “the Supreme Court will agree to review the case at that point”.
Admittedly, these laws are not all the same: while the Alabama and heartbeat
laws provide for a total or near-total ban on abortion, the Utah and Arkansas laws
allow abortion within a time-frame which is similar to the legislation in force in some
Western European countries. Yet, the laws are equally incompatible with the viability
criterion set in Roe.
This 2019 wave of abortion legislation therefore amounts to a state-based campaign
of strategic litigation, the overt goal of which is to overrule Roe. How will the
Supreme Court respond to this challenge? As Danish scientist Niels Bohr wisely
warned, “prediction is very difficult, especially about the future”. Still, a look at the
current composition of the Court as well as its decisions on recent cases might give
some hints on its possible approach.
The composition of the Supreme Court
On paper, we cannot rule out the possibility of a majority willing to overrule Roe.
Leaving the four “liberal” justices aside, Justice Thomas is the one who most clearly
and consistently spelled out his disagreement with the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence. For example, in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007),he wrote separately “to
reiterate [his] view that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and Roe
v. Wade, has no basis in the Constitution”.
Recently appointed Justice Kavanaugh only heard one case on abortion as a
judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Interestingly enough, on
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this occasion, in a dissenting opinion, he stressed that “some disagree with cases
holding that the U.S. Constitution provides a right to an abortion” but “as a lower
court, our job is to follow the law as it is, not as we might wish it to be”. How will he
act now that his job is no longer to follow the law as it is, but to say what the law is?
As Justices Alito and Gorsuch are generally considered opponents to abortion,
the biggest question mark concerns Chief Justice Roberts. While he is known as
a conservative, his capacity as Chief Justice might lead him to avoid overruling an
established precedent, despite personal disagreement, to bolster the legitimacy and
authority of the Court. After all, the concern that overruling Roe’s central holding
“would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power and to
function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law”, was one of
the main arguments in Casey  to reaffirm Roe. That’s why it is worth having a brief
look at the most recent attitude of the Supreme Court with respect to stare decisis.
Ready to overrule?
On 13 May 2019, the Court in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (2019)
held that the Constitution requires states to grant immunity to other states in their
own courts, overruling Nevada v. Hall, a 40-year-old precedent allowing states to
decide whether or not to grant such immunity. The issue itself is not a major one
and definitely does not have anything to do with termination of pregnancy. What is
remarkable, however, is how little attention the judgment pays to stare decisis. Not
only did the Court overrule an established precedent with a strict 5 to 4 majority,
but the opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Thomas devotes no more than one
page to counter the respondent’s defense of Hyatt on the basis of stare decisis.
Moreover, the opinion also does not engage with the criteria the Court developed in
Casey “to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule
of law”. If this decision bears any relevance to the dispute over Roe, it is to show that
the current conservative majority is ready to overrule previous opinions for the simple
reason that it considers them wrongly decided.
This attracted the criticism of the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Breyer
and joined by the three other “liberals.” Recalling Casey, the dissenters blame the
majority for surrendering to the temptation to overrule a decision “only because
five Members of a later Court come to agree with the earlier dissenter” and even
thought the overruled opinion “is a well-reasoned decision that has caused no
serious practical problems in the four decades since we decided it”. The dissent
concludes with a not too veiled allusion to Roe: “Today’s decision can only cause
one to wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.”
Overruling without overruling?
Before the abovementioned 2019 laws reach the Supreme Court, the justices are
likely to be confronted with other abortion laws of 2016-2017 that regulate access
to abortion in a stricter way without frontally challenging the right to a pre-viability
abortion. Restrictions range from forbidding the “dilation and evacuation” abortion
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procedure to requiring doctors to show the woman an ultrasound before abortion,
from prohibiting selective abortion (i.e. abortions sought solely on the basis of the
sex, race or disability of the fetus) to increasing the waiting time before an abortion
can take place, from requiring doctors performing abortions to have admitting
privileges at a nearby hospital to stricter regulations on parental consent and judicial
bypass for minors seeking abortion. Upholding these laws would not necessarily
require an overruling of Roe for they are to be examined in light of the “undue
burden test”. But they might provide the Court with a different path – eroding the
right instead of directly challenging it – to limit de facto the right to have an abortion
without a formal overruling of Roe’s core holding. A loose application of the “undue
burden” test might indeed allow states to impose highly discouraging requirements
both to women seeking abortions and to abortion providers to the extent that while
remaining a right on paper, abortion would in practice be extremely difficult to obtain.
Some of these cases already have reached the Supreme Court, and one might
find hints that the Supreme Court (or some Justices on the bench) might be willing
to follow this path. A Louisiana law requiring doctors performing abortions to have
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital was upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court,
despite the fact that its content is very similar to the Texas law that was struck down
by the Supreme Court in Whole Woman’s Health. On 7 February 2019 the Supreme
Court granted a stay pending the decision on whether to review the case on the
merits. The stay was granted through a strict 5 to 4 majority where the Chief Justice
joined the “liberals” in preventing the law from being enforced. Still the dissent by
Justice Kavanaugh hints at a potential loosening of the undue burden test. The
Justice only considers the factual question of whether the affected doctors will be
able to obtain admitting privileges but does not question whether this requirement
provides any benefit that could justify the burden it imposes, a test that played a
major role in Whole Woman’s Health.
Most recently, in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky,the Supreme
Court was confronted with two issues raised by an Indiana law. On the one hand, the
Court upheld under the “rational basis test”a provision requiring a woman seeking
an abortion to decide how to dispose of the fetal remains; however, the Court did not
exclude future unconstitutionality under the more demanding “undue burden test”.
On the other hand, the Court decided to deny certiorari with respect to a provision
forbidding sex-, race-, and disability-selective abortions. As just one Circuit Court has
thus far ruled on this kind of law, the Court decided to address it at a later stage after
further percolation of the issue in other courts. As a whole, the decision testifies to
a cautious approach of the Court, which appears to be unwilling to address abortion
laws now. This impression is confirmed by the Court’s most recent decision to
deny certiorari in a case concerning a 2016 Alabama law prohibiting dilation and
evacuation abortions that was struck down by a circuit court. Thomas’ concurrence
in Box, however, seems to seize upon the occasion to set the scene for when the
Court will decide the merit of the question. While most of his opinion is devoted
to drawing a strong link between abortion and eugenics, the last part argues that
“whatever else might be said about Casey, it did not decide whether the Constitution
requires States to allow eugenic abortions”. As Roe secures the right to have a pre-
viability abortion regardless of the reasons, and Casey affirmed Roe’s core holding,
- 4 -
one might think that a ban on selective pre-viability abortions is unconstitutional
in light of Roe and Casey. What Thomas suggests, by contrast, is that Casey did
not address the question of selective abortions, so that an exception for selective
abortions might be carved out in Roe and Casey without overruling them.
Politicization of constitutional law?
No matter how close Roe’s overruling may be – which no one can predict now –
the picture drawn in this post suggests that an overruling has never been so close
before. Time will tell whether (and how) the Court will overrule Roe, but the current
developments already invite us, regardless of any future Supreme Court decision, to
reflect on the dynamics and weaknesses of judge-made rights, i.e. rights extracted
from general constitutional clauses via judicial interpretation. No provision in the
federal Constitution or in a federal law expressly guarantees the right of a woman
to have an abortion. As the Supreme Court in 1973 recognized it in more generous
terms than the contemporaneous European legislators, roughly fifty years later the
“same” Court might qualify or even revoke it. If we combine this observation with the
extremely politically charged process of Justices’ appointment – remember Trump’s
quote at the beginning of this text – one might ask whether we are confronted
with a massive politicization of constitutional law and rights. After all, it is not an
exaggeration to say that the meaning of the Constitution and the rights it protects
depend largely on who wins the election. Does this amount to a facial repudiation of
the very idea of the Constitution as something that “withdraw[s] certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and […] establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts”?
To be sure, constitutional law is never fully insulated from political developments. In
Europe, not only Constitutions can be amended – with due cautions – through the
political process, but also constitutional courts’ judges are, at least in part, chosen
by the Parliament. This is meant to increase their legitimacy and to secure that, in
the long run, the constitutional court stays tuned with the political developments.
However, in the U.S., judicial appointment procedure that does not necessarily foster
compromise among the parties, combined with the randomness of vacancies at
the Supreme Court seems to have brought about the politicization of constitutional
adjudication to an extent and a degree that is unknown on the other side of the
Atlantic.
The author thanks Melissa Muller for valuable research assistance. The usual
disclaimers apply.
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